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Abstract: 
 
This paper is oriented to study the relationship between demographical factors and 
international capital flows. We analyse the impact of ageing on foreign direct investments 
(FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) on a bilateral level. Firstly we present a 
theoretical foundation of the relationship and then we test it by an empirical model. 
Theoretical foundations are based on the lifecycle hypothesis and overlapping 
generations model in a demographic context. The bilateral FDI and FPI are modelled by 
using fixed effects balanced panel data. The results suggest that the current and future age 
structure of the nation has significant effect on current international capital flows. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Past decades have shown clear trends of the population ageing in the OECD countries. This is the result 
of the combination of two main developments in these countries: a decrease in the fertility rate and an 
increase in life expectancy. The immigration flows do not compensate for this decrease in the labour 
endowments. As a result the OECD countries will face the problems of insufficient labour force and 
increasing costs of financing the retirement pensions. This is expected to have an important impact on 
the level of future returns on capital, prices of financial assets and international capital movements. 
 
However, the demographic transition processes or age structure evolution have different timings across 
different regions in the world1. Many non-OECD countries will face an important positive labour force 
growth while the OECD countries will be confronted with a negative labour force growth. This implies 
different age structure and dependency ratios across the globe2.  
 
Hence, to the extent that capital is internationally mobile, the important differences in current and 
future dependency ratios implied by these different ageing patterns are supposed to have a positive 
effect on the flows of capital from developed countries (relatively more aged countries) to emerging 
countries (relatively less aged countries). 
 
So far the studies testing an impact of demographical factors on international capital flows focus on a 
very aggregate level (e.g. they use data on current account, capital outflows - defined by the net value 
of gross domestic savings minus domestic investments).   
 
However, as noticed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000), among others, different types of capital flows 
have different properties with regard to features such as risk, liquidity, tradability, reversibility, 
expropriability and tax treatment. Only under perfect information and with no distortions, can we 
consider the capital structure as irrelevant (according to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem). Since 
                                                 
1 Although all facing an increase in the share of the older people and a decline in the share of younger people. 
2 Appendixes 1 and 2 show the old age and young age dependency ratios forecasts for a selected list of countries. All ratios 
are presented as number of dependants per 100 persons of working age. 
demographic factors can have different impacts on different types of international capital flows the 
aggregation of the capital flows can lead to overestimation of the coefficients. 
 
In this paper we analyse the impact of ageing in different types of capital flows, namely on foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI)3, on a bilateral level.  
 
Firstly we present a theoretical foundation of the relationship and then we test it by empirical model. 
Theoretical foundations are based on the Lifecycle Hypothesis and Overlapping Generations (OLG) 
model in a demographic context. The bilateral FDI and FPI are modeled by using fixed effects 
balanced panel data.  
 
The results suggest that the current and future age structure of the nation has significant effect on 
current international capital flows. Moreover, we found evidence that demographic factors have 
different impacts on FPI and FDI. 
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we enlighten some stylised facts. In 
section 3, we give a very brief overview of the theoretical background and empirical works done in this 
field.  In section 4, we build up an empirical model to test the linkages. In section 5, we describe the 
data and variables we use for econometric modelling. In section 6, we report the econometric results. In 
section 7 we conclude and point out several directions for future research. 
 
2. Stylised facts 
 
The world economy is currently confronted with two important trends, one concerns the recent 
evolution in international capital flows, and their role in the developing process of the emerging 
economies, and the other one concerns the current and future evolution in demographical patterns. 
 
                                                 
3 This includes equities and short-term and long-term debt securities. 
On the investment side, capital flows to developing countries have increased in recent years, mostly 
taking the form of FDI. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 1 shows that 
for the period of 1980 to 2008 the FDI net inflows to different developing countries has substantially 
increased. Figure 2 shows that the FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP, for the same period and 
group of countries, also point up an upward trend. 
 
Figure 1: FDI Net Inflows to developing countries (millions of current USD) 
 
Figure 2: FDI Net Inflows (% of GDP) to developing countries 
 
Figures 1 and 2 Source: authors’ calculations from the data of the World Development Indicators 
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 If we look now to the Foreign Portfolio Equity Investments to developing countries, a somewhat 
different pattern is perceptible. Figure 3 illustrates that outline also for the period of 1980 to 2008. We 
can see that the Portfolio Equity net inflows to developing countries remained relatively unchanged in 
the 80´s, increased modestly in the 90´s for most of the observed countries and record a sharp increase 
in the first half of the last decade to end up with a big crash in the most recent years due to the current 
financial crisis4.  
 
Figure 3: Portfolio equity, net inflows to emerging countries (millions of current USD) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from the data of the World Development Indicators 
 
On the demographic side the trend concerns the difference in ageing patterns between industrialized 
and developing countries. Industrialized countries are ageing significantly faster than other countries 
mostly due to the ageing of the baby boom generation and the declining birth rates. In sharp contrast, 
the developing countries have a much younger population. This is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 where 
we can observe the old age dependency ratios5 for a selection of industrialized and emerging countries 
from 1950 to 2050. 
  
                                                 
4 The turning point is 2006, when market rumors that the US economy was slowing down, lead to a big crash in the 
emerging economies stock markets.  
5 The ratios are presented as number of population aged 65+ per 100 persons of working age (15-65). 
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Figure 4: Old Age Dependency Ratios for a selection of developed countries 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from the data of the United Nations World Population Projects 
 
Figure 5: Old Age Dependency Ratios for a selection of developing countries 
 
Source: authors’ calculations from the data of the United Nations World Population Projects 
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In the Figures we can observe that the old age dependency ratio forecast for 2050 is substantially 
higher for the developed countries than for the developing countries. As an example we can highlight 
the case of Japan, Germany Spain and Portugal, industrialized economies that are expected to have a 
three times higher old age dependency ratio than Angola, South Africa, Egypt or India. Even within the 
two groups of countries there are significant different age patterns between countries. In the group of 
developed countries, we can observe in Figure 4 that Japan is expected to have more that the double of 
old age dependents than the United States. Similarly, in the group of developing countries, we can see 
in Figure 5, that Russia is expected to have by 2050 a four times higher old dependency ratio than 
Angola. 
 
The important differences in current and future dependency ratios implied by these different ageing 
patterns are supposed to have a positive effect on the flows of capital to emerging markets through 
three different channels. Firstly, the ageing of populations in industrial countries could lead to an 
increase in savings of working people in the short to medium term. Secondly, differences in 
demographics are likely to reinforce the differentials in the expected rates of return to capital between 
industrial and developing countries. Thirdly, the ageing of populations in industrial countries is leading 
to pressures for pension reform. These reforms, some of them already in course in most of the OECD 
countries, are likely to result in greater responsiveness on the part of pension funds to investment 
opportunities in developing countries. And even within developed countries we can expect capital 
flows from relatively more aged countries to relatively less aged countries, since the age patterns within 
OECD countries also record significant differences, as stressed out before.   
 
3. Theoretical background and earlier empirical works 
 
The first group of studies in this field relies on the Life Cycle Theory of consumption and savings by 
Modigliani, which makes use of the dependency hypothesis6 (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954 and 
Ando and Modigliani 1963). 
 
                                                 
6 Formulated by Coale and Hoover (1958). 
The lifecycle hypothesis states that individuals tend to smooth their consumption over time. Individuals 
accumulate assets during their working years and consume these assets during their retirement years 
(Bommier and Lee 2000). According to the hypothesis, individuals tend to consume different kinds of 
assets at different moments in their lifetime. In the beginning of their active life, they tend to invest in 
housing and progressively in more risky assets. As they grow old and have fewer working years ahead 
of them, they tend to invest in less risky assets as they cannot rely anymore on an income in the next 
period of their life (the retirement period). In other words, in earlier periods of their working life, they 
are willing to bear more risk because they rely on their income. In the last period of life, people’s 
income is smaller thus becoming more averse towards risky assets. Thus people seem to shift from 
preference for risky assets to preferences for less risky assets. This hypothesis is also occasionally 
called the Lifecycle Risk Aversion Hypothesis, which establishes the rationale for agents with 
constant risk aversion to substitute from equity to bonds as they age, assuming that most investors’ 
labour income are poorly correlated with stock returns.  
 
Several empirical studies confirm the relationship between savings and age predicted by the life cycle 
theory (Mason 1988 and Collins 1991, among others). 
 
However, these studies do not take into account the capital demand side and only under perfect capital 
mobility is this justified. Otherwise domestic savings and investment are jointly determined and cannot 
be analysed separately. Higgins (1998) is one of the authors that clearly state the necessity of taking 
into account the capital mobility when analyzing demographic effects because incomplete capital 
mobility can hamper demographically induced capital flows. As many studies have shown, capital is 
mostly not mobile (e.g., see French and Poterba 1991, Frankel 1992, Obstfeld 1995, Kang and Stulz 
1997 and Portes and Rey 1999). 
 
The most recent studies in the field rely on the Overlapping Generations (OLG) model, that derives 
follows directly from the life cycle hypothesis, which is its essence. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) 
developed the first computable general equilibrium model of dynamic life-cycle economies. The 
simplest OLG model captures the fact that a population includes people with different ages and 
different planning horizons and that these individuals at different stages of their lifecycles interact in 
markets. It enables us therefore to aggregate the behaviours of individuals at different stages of their 
lifecycle (described previously according to the lifecycle hypothesis) within a closed or open entity and 
to analyse the effects of interactions between groups of individuals.  
 
Higgins and Williamson (1996) were able to show that investment is clearly linked to the labour force 
growth that needs to be equipped with capital. They also showed that savings rates are high for a large 
work force and decline gradually as the economy grows older. The authors concluded that we can 
expect a current account deficit in “young” economies because of their investment demand and their 
low level of national savings. The deficit then turns into a surplus as the economy becomes more aged.7 
Higgins (1998) found empirical evidence for savings, investment and net capital flows’ patterns 
predicted in their simulation model. However, it can be problematic to interpret some of these results. 
Namely current account includes transactions in goods, services, and interest payments, between 
countries. The most suitable way to analyse investment behaviour would be focusing on transactions 
reflected by capital account. 
 
Moreover, the present demographic patterns are not the only factor affecting current capital flows. 
Lührmann (2006) argues that expectations of the future demography should be taken into account in 
explaining present capital flows. She finds that if forward-looking agents expect demographic pressures 
to put in danger their retirement income due to reduced capital returns or unsustainable public pension 
system in future, people might decide to supplement their mandatory pension savings by increased 
private savings in order to provide themselves with a certain level of retirement income. The result of 
such anticipative behaviour could be high net capital outflows from industrialized countries to 
emerging markets in the present, if domestic investments remain roughly constant. The allocation of 
capital across countries might depend on the degree of imperfection of the destination country’s 
domestic capital market. Probably the best examples of capital flows that cannot be redirected each 
period are FDIs. However Lürhmann was not the first author to discuss the role of expectations in 
explaining capital flows8. 
                                                 
7 The country becomes a net capital exporter when it has a larger working population. 
8 Poterba (1998 and 2004) discusses anticipation effects and notes that forward-looking behavior by agents implies that 
savings and investment decisions are taken on the basis of present discounted values of the future earnings of investment 
 Brooks (2003) developed an OLG model with rational, forward-looking agents and found evidence that 
age distribution has significant effects on financial markets and that although agents are forward-
looking, the transition from Baby-Boom to Baby-Burst will lead to a sharp decline in asset returns. 
 
More recently, Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2006) used a stylised multi-country overlapping 
generations model and long-term demographic projections for different sets of countries to project 
international capital flows over a seventy-year period and they found evidence that population ageing 
results, at least in an initial stage, in a higher capital stock, but when the Baby Boom generations start 
to consume their retirement savings the capital stock is expected to decrease. Their simulations suggest 
that significant effects of capital mobility will occur, even if capital flows are restricted to the OECD 
(capital flows from fast ageing countries to less fast ageing countries). They also conclude that saving 
rates, rates of return and international capital flows react substantially less to demographic change once 
households absorb some part of the demographic shock by lengthening the working period in their 
lives. 
 
According to these models, individuals who save during their working lives to finance their 
consumption during retirement generate the capital stock in a country. Therefore a high population 
share of people in their thirties and forties is likely to generate a strong tendency towards capital 
outflows, while countries with higher youth dependency rates tend to be net importers. 
 
All the authors mentioned so far focus mainly on the changes in the direction and volume of the 
international capital flows induced by demographic factors on an aggregate level. They do not pay an 
explicit attention to the impact of demographic factors in the different types of capital flows. As 
noticed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000), among others, different types of capital flows have 
different properties and according to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem only under perfect information 
and with no distortions, can we consider the capital structure as irrelevant. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
goods and the value of savings. Brooks (2000) also focuses on the anticipation effects making the question “What will 
happen to financial markets when the Baby Boomers retire?” 
 
The aggregation can therefore lead to wrong conclusions. In the following sections we try to 
compensate for this lack in the literature. We analyse the impact of ageing on foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) on a bilateral level.  
 
The reasons for foreign portfolio investment flows were discussed above. To the best of our knowledge 
no literature has been issued concerning the direct relationships between ageing and FDIs. However 
there are certainly some linkages to be considered, which we can identify using traditional theories for 
explaining FDI flows. First of all the reason for investing into foreign countries could be the total 
output and market size of the destination country. The market seeking investors would go to the 
markets where there is a lower percentage of retired people. Moreover, if the destination country faces 
a higher youth dependency rate, the workers are expected to have lower savings rates and higher 
consumption rates. This could result in an investment gap and consumption deficit, which both 
encourage foreign investments into this country. 
 
The additional reason to move from “aged” economies to “young” economies can be derived from the 
life cycle theory (Vernon 1966). First of all when the overall population size does not change and there 
are more retired people in an economy, who normally in average consume less, then the maturity stage 
of product life cycle will come earlier. Therefore the producers who want to compensate for R&D and 
product introduction costs will search for a lower-cost production destination and/or the markets with 
higher consumption. Especially it will be true for durable goods production. 
 
Finally, if there is an oligopolistic competition then the oligopolistic reaction theory of Knickerbocker 
(1973) would predict even higher flows to the “younger” economies. Mainly because of two reasons: 
following the leader or “threatening” other firms on their home or main markets. 
 
So we can expect the increase of FDI to “younger” economies from the side of market-seeking or/and 
efficiency-seeking foreign investors.  
 
In what follows we develop an empirical specification in order to establish the link between 
demographic patters and FDI and FPI flows. 
 4. Empirical Strategy 
 
In this section we develop an empirical specification in order to study the impact of ageing on foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and foreign portfolio investments (FPI) on a bilateral level. The bilateral FDI 
and FPI are modelled by using fixed effects balanced panel data.  
 
We analyse a panel dataset with 8 capital source countries9 and 38 capital host countries10 (see 
appendix 1 for the list of countries) for the years 2001 to 2007. As dependent variables we use FDI 
end-of-the-year positions by partner country and FPI end-of-the-year positions by partner country (as 
discussed in more detail in section 5). Unfortunately there were no longer time series data available for 
bilateral FDI and bilateral FPI. 
 
The regression specification of the fixed effects model is:   
 
࢟࢏࢐࢚ ൌ  ࢼ૙ ൅ ࢾ૛ࢊ૛࢚ ൅ ࢾ૜ࢊ૜࢚ ൅ ڮ ൅ ࢾࢀࢊࢀ࢚ ൅ ࢼ૚࢞࢏࢐࢚૚ ൅ ࢼ૛࢞࢏࢐࢚૛ ൅ ࢇ࢏࢐൅࢛࢏࢐࢚ , 
for t=1,2,3,...,T 
 
Where ࢟࢏࢐࢚ are investments positions of a origin country i in a destination country j on time 
t. ܌૛ܜ, ܌૜ܜ and ܌܂ܜ are time period dummies.  ࢇ࢏࢐ represents fixed effects (captures all unobserved, 
time-constant factors that affect ࢟࢏࢐࢚).  ࢞࢏࢐࢚૚ are control variables capturing features of the economy of 
the two countries, ࢞࢏࢐࢚૛ are the variables for the demographical factors for the origin country and the 
destination country. ࢛࢏࢐࢚ is the error term.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 OECD countries (relatively more aged countries). 
10 OECD and non-OECD countries (relatively less aged countries). 
5. Data and variables  
 
As dependent variables we use FDI end-of-the-year positions by partner country and FPI end-of-the-
year positions by partner country. FDI data comes from OECD (International Direct Investment 
Statistics) and are presented in millions of US dollars. FPI data comes from the Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey Data (CPIS), which is released by the International Monetary Fund, and accounts 
for Total Portfolio Investments (equities, short-term and long-term debt securities).  
 
In order to capture features of the economy of the origin and destination country that can induce capital 
flows we use the following control variables (data sources in parenthesis)11:  
       
(1) GDPOC and GDPDC (World Development Indicators - WDI) – gross domestic product in the 
capital origin country and capital destination country, respectively. These variables are used to measure 
the level of development of the economy that determines the level of savings that the economy can 
generate. In addition, these variables determine the level of human capital, the level of economic 
development and the development of financial markets (Market Potential). We expect both variables to 
have a positive effect on international capital flows.  
 
(2) MARKCAPDC (WDI) - market capitalization level of the capital destination country as a proxy for 
the market share of private business in a country. In addition this indicator presents the proxy for the 
level of development of the financial market. A positive sign is expected since the more developed the 
financial market of a country is, the more capital inflows are expected to occur.  
 
(3) GKFDC (WDI) – gross capital formation on destination country. A negative sign is expected. As 
the gross capital formation in the destination country increases foreign capital inflows are expected to 
diminish (assuming that the investment gap diminishes with the increase in Gross capital formation) 
 
(4) FREEDC (Freedom House) - a variable to capture national political stability on the destination 
country -political rights and civil liberties as a proxy of political stability. The justification for the use 
                                                 
11 Complete list of data sources is provided in appendix 2. 
of such variables is that political instability is connected with economic and financial instability and in 
that sense might influence the investor’s decision. It is expected that the higher the political stability of 
a country, the higher the capital inflows to the destination country. A negative sign is expected12. 
 
(5) EFREEDC (Heritage Foundation) - a variable to capture economic freedom and prosperity in the 
destination country. If a government exerts coercion above a certain level in the market place, 
economic growth might suffer and that is expected to diminish the capital inflows to the host country. 
A positive sign is expected13. 
 
Demographic factors are then measured by the following demographical variables14: 
 
(1) DEPODC15 (WDI) - current old age dependency ratio of the destination country. Assuming that 
old-age is associated with pure dissaving, an increase in the share of the elderly should induce negative 
capital flows from the capital origin country to the capital destination country (“old” economies tend 
towards running current account deficits). Therefore a negative sign is expected for the coefficient of 
this variable.  
 
(2) DEPYDC16 (WDI) - current youth age dependency ratio of the destination country. Higgins and 
Williamson (1996) found that we can expect a current account deficit in “young” economies because of 
their investment demand and their low level of national savings. Therefore countries with relatively 
                                                 
12 Political Rights and Civil Liberties are measured on a 1-7 scale, with 1 representing the highest degree of Freedom and 7 
the lowest. The Grading Scale used is: “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free,” “partly free,” and “not free”. Until 
2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and for Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were 
designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free.” Beginning with the ratings for 
2003, countries whose combined average ratings fall between 3.0 and 5.0 are "Partly Free," and those between 5.5 and 7.0 
are "Not Free."   
13 To measure economic freedom and rate each country, the authors of the Index measure ten components of economic 
freedom, assigning a grade to each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten 
component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic freedom score for each country. The ten components of 
economic freedom are: Business Freedom , Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, 
Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, Labor Freedom. 
14 All ratios are presented as number of dependants per 100 people in working age (15-65). 
15 Old age dependency ratio is defined as ratio of the population 65+ to the working-age population between ages 15 and 65. 
16 Youth age dependency ratio is defined as ratio of the population between 0-14 to the working-age population between 
ages 15 and 65. 
high youth dependency rates have a propensity to be capital importers. We expect a positive sign for 
the coefficient of this variable. 
 
(3) DEPOF20OC (Projections of the United Nations) - old dependency ratio forecast in 20 years time 
of the origin country. If forward-looking agents expect demographic pressures (an increase in the share 
of the elderly) to put in danger their retirement income17, they might decide to supplement their 
mandatory pension savings by increased private savings today in order to provide themselves with a 
certain level of retirement income. The result of such anticipative behaviour could be an increase in 
capital flows from relatively more aged countries to relatively less aged countries in the present18. A 
positive sign is therefore expected. 
 
(4) DEPYF20DC (Projections of the United Nations) - youth dependency ratio forecast in 20 years 
time for the destination country. If there are expectations that the destination country will have a higher 
youth dependency rate in the future, then lower saving rates and higher consumption rates in the 
upcoming future are expected. That can result in an investment gap and consumption deficit. Moreover 
it will have a positive impact in the future market size. This might encourage foreign investments into 
that country already in the present. This is especially feasible for FDIs since they are usually long term 
investments and cannot be redirected each period. The expected sign for the coefficient of this variable 
is therefore positive. 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
This section presents the results of the empirical specification developed in section 4. We report results 
for FDI and FPI end-of-the-year positions of a origin country i in a destination country j. As follows we 
discuss the results for the two dependent variables. The panel data analysis gives us results, which are 
in accordance with our expectations. As table 1 shows, the general performance of the model is 
satisfactory for both regressions.  
                                                 
17 Due to reduced capital returns or unsustainable public pension system in future. 
18 Assuming that domestic investments remain roughly constant. 
Table 1: Balanced Panel Data (Fixed Effects) 
Explanatory  
Variables 
ܨܦܫ௜௝
Foreign Direct Investment of a 
origin country i in a destination 
country j 
ܨܲܫ௜௝ 
Foreign Portfolio Investment of a 
origin country i in a destination 
country j 
Constant -142,610*** -332,139*** 
 (38,475) (86,195) 
GDPOC 0.00487*** 0.0255*** 
 (0.00188) (0.00535) 
GDPDC 0.0274*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.00757) (0.0212) 
MARKAPDC -3.12e-10 5.48e-09 
 (1.02e-09) (4.76e-09) 
GKFDC -4.38e-08** -1.15e-07** 
 (1.73e-08) (5.03e-08) 
FREEDC 332.5 904.9 
 (472.5) (1,551) 
EFREEDC 85.70 435.4 
 (78.77) (272.8) 
Explanatory Demographic 
Variables  
 
DEPOOC -2,257*** -5,318*** 
 (810.8) (2,050) 
DEPYDC 1,618*** 8,564*** 
 (489.2) (1,741) 
DEPYF20DC 1,941** -1,621 
 (835.4) (2,352) 
DEPOF20OC 2,132*** 3,507* 
 (702.0) (1,899) 
Observations 2072 2072 
No. of source countries 8 8 
No.of host countries 38 38 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
R-squared 0.329 0.459 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% confidence level. 
 
 
The explanatory power of the regression with FPI as dependent variable is to some extent bigger than 
the one with FDI dependent variable (ܴଶ=0.459 and ܴଶ=0.329 respectively). 
 
Regarding the control variables, used in order to capture features of the economy of the origin and 
destination countries that can induce capital flows, three are statistically significant in both regressions 
(GDPOC, GDPDC, GKFDC). 
 
GDPOC and GDPDC, used as measurements of economic size, present a positive sign for both 
regressions and this goes according to our expectations. In recent years several studies applied the 
methods from traditional gravity models to bilateral international investments19 and found that the 
market size of source and destination counties have a positive effect on cross-border capital flows.20  
 
Gross capital formation on destination country (GKFDC) exerts a very small, but statistically 
significant, negative influence on both dependent variables. That goes according to our expectations for 
the reasons offered in section 5.  
 
The other three variables used as control variables (MARKAPDC, FREEDC and EFREEDC) are not 
statistically significant for both regressions with ܨܦܫ௜௝ and ܨܲܫ௜௝ as dependent variables. 
 
To study the impact of the current age structure of a country on bilateral international capital flows we 
use two variables, namely the DEPOOC and DEPYDC.  Both variables are highly significant at a 1% 
level for both regressions. This confirms that the present age structure influences cross-border capital 
flows 
 
The DEPOOC variable is the old dependency ratio in the capital origin country. The coefficient 
presents a negative sign for both FDI and FPI regressions confirming our prediction that an increase in 
the share of the elderly (associated with dissaving) is linked with a tendency towards capital inflows to 
the source country (repatriation of capital). The most obvious difference between the two regressions 
lies on the magnitude: the coefficient of the variable DEPOOC is more than the double for FPI than it 
is for FDI.  
 
                                                 
19 Studies on FDI include Wei (2000) and Stein and Daude (2007) and studies on portfolio equity flows include the one of 
Portes and Rey (2005). 
20 Also the distance between countries (among others) influence capital flows but since we use a fixed effects specification 
in our analysis time-invariant variables are included in ܽ௜௝ as explained in section 3. 
The variable DEPYDC, which accounts for the youth dependency ratio for the destination country, has 
a positive effect both on FPI and FDI, as we predicted. That can be explained because “young” 
economies have a high investment demand while generating few savings domestically, and that tends 
to draw the economy into a current account deficit. That implies an increase in the capital flows from 
the source to the host country. We want to stress that the differences in magnitude of the demographic 
effect on explaining FDI and FPI flows are again considerable. In this case the magnitude is five times 
higher for the FPI regression than it is for the FDI regression. That comes as no surprise as it confirms 
our hypothesis that demographic factors have different impacts on FPI and FDI since different types of 
capital flows have different properties21.  
 
The observed differences in magnitude can probably be explained with the fact that FPI usually have 
more liquidity and tradability than FDI. Moreover the former is usually more driven by present factors 
than the latter, which is usually a somewhat longer term investment and cannot be redirected each 
period. 
 
To test the possibility that international capital flows can be related to the expectations about the future 
demographic trends we use two additional demographic variables, namely the DEPOF20OC and 
DEPYF20DC. At this juncture, the distinctions between the two regressions are even more significant.  
 
The variable DEPOF20OC presents a positive sign confirming our expectations. It is significant at the 
5% level for the regression with FDI as dependent variable and significant at the 10% for the second 
regression, with FPI as dependent variable. The magnitudes are also different for both regressions (to 
some extent bigger for the FPI than for FDI). If forward-looking agents in the origin country expect an 
increase in the share in the elderly in 20 years time they are likely to increase private savings today and 
that can lead to an increase in the current capital flows from relatively more aged countries to relatively 
less aged countries22. 
 
                                                 
21 As noticed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000), among others. 
22 As noticed before, differences in demographics are likely to reinforce the differentials in the expected rates of return to 
capital between industrial (relatively more aged countries) and developing countries (relatively less aged countries), making 
the investment in developing countries more attractive relatively to the investment in developed countries. 
The variable DEPYF20DC is only statistically significant for the regression with FDI as dependent 
variable (at a 5% level) presenting the expected positive sign. For the regression with FPI as dependent 
variable it is not statistically relevant and the sign is not according to our expectations. Once more the 
divergence in the results can be explained by the different properties of the capital flows. As aforesaid 
FDI are usually long term capital flows while FPI are usually short and medium term capital flows. 
Moreover FPI23 are relatively less forward looking than FDI. 
 
These results confirm our hypothesis that future age structure of the nation has significant effect on current 
international capital flows and reinforce the confirmation of our suspicious that demographic factors have 
different impacts on FPI and FDI and therefore deserve a separate study.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper develops an empirical framework in order to study the impact of ageing on international 
capital flows. The Life Cycle Theory, Overlapping Generation’s (OLG) model, and some recent 
empirical works suggest that ageing of populations can lead to an increase in savings of working 
population. At the same time increase in the share of elderly people and youth can decrease the savings 
of the economy and the capital demand because of lower level of labor force. As a result differences in 
demographics are likely to reinforce the differentials in the expected rates of return to capital between 
industrial (faster ageing) countries and developing (slowly ageing) countries in the future. But the 
current age structure of a nation should not be the only factor to be taken into account. The 
expectations about the future age structure of the nation can force forward-looking agents to change 
their investment behavior in favor of relatively younger countries. This might lead to higher capital 
export from developed countries to emerging economies already today. 
To test these relationships we use fixed effects balanced panel data with bilateral FDI and FPI positions 
as dependent variables.  
                                                 
23 Portfolio Investments are usually connected with the expression “hot money” in the financial press. 
The results, presented in section 6, suggest that the current and future age structure of the nations has 
significant effect on current international capital flows. Moreover, we found evidence that demographic 
factors have different impacts on FPI and FDI.  
There are several directions for future research. One important issue is the role of the precedent 
bilateral FDI and FPI flows to explain present bilateral capital flows. If we find that the existence of 
previous cross-border capital flows influence present and future capital flows a dynamic panel data 
model, with lagged dependent variables, might be preferable to the fixed effects balanced panel data 
used in our study.  
A problem that might arise with the use of lagged dependent variables is the significant correlation of 
the lagged dependent variable with the error term in the scenario of a short time dimension and a larger 
country dimension (the state of this paper analysis). However even if no longer-time-series data 
become available in the future, for bilateral FDI and bilateral FPI, using the Arellano – Bond Dynamic 
Panel GMM Estimators might solve the correlation issues. 
Another interesting topic would be to learn if the recent financial crisis increases the differentials in the 
expected rates of return of capital between faster ageing countries and slowly ageing countries. We 
defer that for future research. 
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Appendix 1: Old Age Dependency Ratio Projections 
Country Name 2010 2030 2050 
Algeria 7 13 27 
Angola 5 6 8 
Argentina 17 21 30 
Australia 21 34 40 
Austria 26 40 52 
Belgium 26 41 46 
Brazil 10 20 36 
Cameroon 6 7 10 
Canada 20 37 43 
Chile 13 26 36 
China 11 24 38 
Czech Republic 22 33 48 
Denmark 26 37 40 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 7 12 20 
Finland 26 43 44 
France 26 41 47 
Germany 31 48 59
Hungary 24 31 44 
India 8 12 20 
Indonesia 9 15 29 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 7 13 31 
Ireland 17 25 41 
Italy 31 44 62 
Japan 35 53 74 
Korea, Rep. 15 18 28 
Mexico 10 18 36 
Morocco 8 15 26 
Netherlands 23 40 44
New Zealand 19 33 39 
Nigeria 6 6 9 
Norway 23 33 40 
Philippines 7 12 19 
Poland 19 35 52 
Portugal 27 39 59 
Romania 21 28 49 
Russian Federation 18 30 39 
South Africa 7 12 15 
Spain 25 36 59 
Sweden 28 37 41 
Switzerland 26 40 45 
Thailand 11 23 32 
Turkey 9 15 29 
Ukraine 22 31 42 
United Kingdom 25 34 38 
United States 19 32 35 
Venezuela, RB 9 16 25 
Source: Data gathered from United Nations World Population Prospects:  
The 2008 Revision Population Database. 
 
Appendix 2: Youth Age Dependency Ratio Projections 
Country Name 2010 2030 2050 
Algeria 39 32 28 
Angola 84 66 47 
Argentina 39 32 28 
Australia 28 28 28 
Austria 22 23 25 
Belgium 25 27 28 
Brazil 38 25 23 
Cameroon 73 54 41 
Canada 23 26 26 
Chile 32 29 27 
China 28 25 25 
Czech Republic 20 22 27 
Denmark 28 27 27 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 51 38 31 
Finland 25 28 27 
France 28 28 29 
Germany 20 21 23
Hungary 21 22 25 
India 48 33 27 
Indonesia 40 29 27 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 33 27 27 
Ireland 31 26 28 
Italy 22 20 25 
Japan 21 19 22 
Korea, Rep. 22 27 26 
Mexico 43 29 26 
Morocco 42 34 29 
Netherlands 26 27 27
New Zealand 30 29 27 
Nigeria 78 55 41 
Norway 28 28 27 
Philippines 54 40 32 
Poland 21 20 22 
Portugal 23 20 24 
Romania 22 20 23 
Russian Federation 21 23 27 
South Africa 47 40 33 
Spain 22 22 28 
Sweden 25 28 28 
Switzerland 22 25 27 
Thailand 30 28 28 
Turkey 39 29 27 
Ukraine 20 24 27 
United Kingdom 26 28 27 
United States 30 29 28 
Venezuela, RB 45 35 29 
Source: Data gathered from United Nations World Population Prospects:  
The 2008 Revision Population Database. 
 
Appendix 3: List of Countries 
Source Countries (8) Host Countries (38) 
America Northern America Africa  
 United States of America 
 South Africa 
Europe Euro Zone America Central America 
 France  Mexico 
 Germany  Northern America 
 Italy  United States of America 
 Netherlands  Canada 
 EU non-Euro Zone  South America
 Denmark  Argentina 
 United Kingdom  Brazil 
 Western Europe  Chile 
 Switzerland  Venezuela 
  Asia Eastern Asia 
   China 
   Japan 
   Republic of Korea 
   Southern Asia 
   India 
   South-Eastern Asia 
   Indonesia 
   Philippines 
   Thailand 
   Western Asia 
   Turkey 
  Europe Euro Zone 
   France 
   Germany 
   Ireland 
   Italy 
   Netherlands 
   Portugal 
   Spain 
   EU Non-Euro Zone 
   Czech Republic 
   Denmark 
   Hungary 
   Norway 
   Poland 
   Romania 
   Sweden 
   United Kingdom 
   Eastern Europe 
   Russian Federation 
   Ukraine 
   Western Europe 
   Switzerland 
  Oceania  
   Australia 
   New Zealand 
Notes: Countries listed according to the United Nations geoscheme. 
Appendix 2: Data Sources 
Variable Name Label Sources 
Foreign Direct Investments  FDI OECD  
International Direct Investment Statistics  
 
Foreign Portfolio 
Investments 
FPI IMF 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Data (CPIS) – International 
Monetary Fund 
GDP GDPSC  
GDPHC 
World Bank 
World Development Indicators 
Market capitalization level MARKAPHC World Bank 
World Development Indicators  
Gross capital Formation GKFHC World Bank 
World Development Indicators  
Political rights and civil 
liberties 
FREEHC Freedom House 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 
Economic freedom EFREEHC Heritage Foundation 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/ 
Current Demographic Data DEPOSC 
DEPYHC   
World Bank 
World Development Indicators  
Demographic Projections DEPOF20SC  
DEPYF20HC  
UN 
Projections of the United nations (United Nations World Population 
Projects) 
 
 
